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INTRODUCTION 
Ethnic division is a source of both conflict and cooperation in all societies. 
Conflicts erupt and escalate when sparked by political power struggles and are 
underpinned by complicated political alliances in which ethnic identity and affili-
ations are key variables. The post-Cold War international system is experiencing an 
increase in the scope and intensity of conflicts underlined by violent and internecine 
ethnic rivalries. The former Yugoslavia, Somalia, South Africa, and Liberia are the 
more recent and notable cases. To a greater or lesser extent, many of the interethnic 
conflict situations that have either subsided or are ongoing have antecedents 
involving colonial rule or a foreign group.1 While this historical legacy perhaps is 
a major contributory factor to many of the varied internal political, economic, and 
social issues, the roots of ongoing conflicts are often actions and policies established 
during colonial rule, even though the colonial power may no longer be directly 
involved in the conflict. Examples are power left in the hands of favored minorities; 
the divide and rule tactics of colonial administrators; and artificial borders that 
permanently separated members of the same ethnic group. Moreover, the "we-
feeling" or communauté de conscience associated with each ethnic group, in times 
of crisis become further polarized and come into direct confrontation with that of 
other ethnic groups. One consequence may be violence or civil war. It is therefore 
essential, as armed conflicts continue to erupt, that the underlying factors that spawn 
ethnic polarization in African political conflicts be examined. This analysis is 
therefore an examination of first, situational factors of ethnic-based violence; 
second, social-structural imbalances as elements of ethnic polarization; and finally, 
the relationship of these factors to ethnopolitical violence in the Liberian Civil War. 
Very often ethnopolitical situations develop out of politico-economic crises 
of the state and patterns of ethnic domination. In a sense, the eruption of ethnic 
clashes are predetermined and are neither fully foreseen nor completely intended by 
the participants. Unequal or competitive relations between ethnic groups help to 
shape a society's state and ethnic structures thereby affecting the domestic context 
from which civil war erupts. 
ETHNIC BASED CONFLICTS: AN OVERVIEW 
Ethnic differences permeate the psychological, social-structural, and cul-
tural dimensions of human interaction.2 The psychological dimension focuses 
largely on the problem of ethnic identity which includes the individual's orientation 
to, and the extent of their commitment to, factors related to ethnicity. At the 
sociological level, social networks define the individual's ethnic group; these are in 
turn related to frequency of contacts, rights and duties associated with ethnicity and 
the traditions of that group. At the cultural level are all factors of ethnic culture, 
which include among other things, traditions and history, which in turn are related 
to sentiments, codes of social action and individual conduct. 
Based on the ongoing conflicts in many developing countries, it appears that 
the issue of allocation of resources is a more important source of conflict when the 
parties to the conflict occupy the same territory. This economic and psycho-cultural 
dimension of conflict has been expressed as a situation of social conflict usually 
accompanied by a felt or actual discrepancy in the power relations of the parties. In 
the language of relative economic deprivation it is a case of a discrepancy between 
value expectations and value capabilities.' In a similar vein, many other analysts 
view conflict as a struggle over values and claims to finite resources, power and 
status, where the goals of one rival are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate the other.4 
Such intergroup rivalry is based largely on the premise that one group had what the 
other wanted — the source of conflict could be land, more economic opportunities, 
and the like. 
The delineation of national boundaries, in particular, has contributed to the 
exacerbation of conflicts between different ethnic groups. The growing 
centralization of state power to administer those arbitrarily created states has 
resulted in the ruling group within these new states enjoying automatically the 
advantages of control over foreign aid, trade, investments, and alliances in 
general. The social distance between ethnic groups often leads to a situation in 
which dominant groups frequently refuse other populations a fair share of the 
country's resources. The structure of inequality is aggravated during periods of 
economic austerity, as dominant groups attempt to maintain their advantageous 
economic, political, or social position. Widening inequality is sometimes 
accompanied by persecution, resulting either from a challenge against the 
dominant group; or the persecution could lead to a challenge by the oppressed 
group. In other words, ethnopolitical conflicts take a variety of forms. There are 
situations where ethnic groups are relatively equal in power as well as 
circumstances where they are ordered in a hierarchy of power. Ethnopolitical 
conflicts, according to conventional wisdom, will be more common and less 
amenable to control in the former case than in the latter. Another distinction is 
that in developing countries ethnopolitical conflicts often center around 
competition for political dominance, whereas in developed countries they often 
involve separatist movements by ethnic minorities and repression by the 
government.5 A third distinction can be made among different types of violent 
ethnopolitical conflicts based on the goals of the participants in the conflict. 
Accordingly ethnopolitical violence falls into four categories: 1) separatist 
movements (the Armenians in Azerbaijan, or the Basques in Spain): 2) rivalry 
for autonomy or political power or territorial control (such as the Hutu and Tutsi 
in Rwanda and Burundi. Albanians in Serbia, or the Zulu in South Africa); 3) 
conquest where violence occurs as part of a war between two or more nations 
where ethnopolitical differences are a major factor (examples are Bosnian 
Muslims and Serbs, and Croats and Serbs); and 4) survival where violence occurs 
as part of an attempt by a national government or majority groups to forcibly 
assimilate, harm, remove or drive out an ethnic minority (examples are Turks and 
other non-ethnic Germans in Germany, Copts in Egypt, or Shiite Muslims in Iraq, 
among others). 
One of the older and best-known theories of intergroup rivalry has been 
labelled "realistic group conflict theory.*'6 According to this position, intergroup 
conflict is motivated by a competition for a scarce external resource and group 
action is instrumental in winning this zero-sum contest. This theory obviously 
underscores a resource-denial strategy by one group against another, with the 
former group commandeering valued resources for its own group members. Such 
intergroup hostility will be non-existent if individuals in a society are not affected 
by such discriminating practices. The motivation to engage in realistic group 
conflict is undermined if people see that they have access to these resources despite 
their group membership. More often than not, the "ingroup" perpetuates a resource-
denial strategy because of the benefits involved; at the same time the "outgroup" is 
confined in a helpless or ineffectual situation. The ingroup further ensures its 
security by repressive and other security measures targeted against the outgroup. 
The level of violence in conflict situations then becomes a function of intensity of 
motivation. Violence is directed toward the outgroup because important economic, 
power, or security goals are involved. That is, destructively violent conflicts 
(Liberia, Sri Lanka, former Yugoslavia, among others) involve strong motives, 
which supply the energy necessary for action. In all instances, economic inequality 
suffered by one group is the dynamic element in the conflict.7 Political power can 
also be involved. The ingroup, or group in power usually institutionalizes violence 
which is manifested in violence by police and army and labelled "law and order."s 
Political power thus leads to a possibility of action through the legal machinery to 
establish a monopoly of violence in the hands of the ruling group. This strategy of 
power consolidation, which tends to erupt into ethnopolitical violence, is 
particularly applicable to many ethnopolitical conflict situations in Africa. 
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN AFRICA 
Since the period of decolonization in Africa some three decades ago, power 
political struggles between various groups within the new African states, 
consolidation of power within a state by a dominant group, and discrimination 
resulting from competition for scarce resources have been some of the key 
conditions of ethnicity as a factor in African armed conflicts. In many parts of 
Africa, the existing ethnic tensions have been exacerbated by a combination of 
artificial states and a transfer of power to a hand-picked ethnic group by departing 
colonial powers. The 
consequence is that the ruling group tends to exclude others from power even though 
burdens of taxation are shared equally. 
Actual and potential conflicts are common even among the most stable 
African nations. In Guinea with the death of Sekou Toure, the Susu and Fula 
overthrew the dominance of the Mandingo, a control that endured more than 25 
years. In Nigeria, the Yoruba and Ibo feel the Fulani manage to dominate whatever 
government comes to power. In Cameroon, in 1984 northern Muslims attempted to 
overthrow the government of Christian president, Paul Biya, who is from the south 
and accused of representing those tribes.9 Ethnic conflicts in African states are often 
couched in struggles between political parties. They are frequently the justification 
for the centralization of power within a single party, or for the establishment of 
military dictatorships. Dictators have often consolidated their power and legiti-
mized their activities through the single party system. The outcome is frequently the 
consolidation of power within a single party system and within a single ethnic group 
resulting in attacks on other ethnic groups. The Idi Amin regime in Uganda, and the 
Amhara-dominated Ethiopian government were two blatant examples. In the case 
of the latter, competition for land produced state-sponsored colonization programs. 
In the early 1980s, it was reported that the Amhara-dominated government uprooted 
more than 20,000 Oromo residents in a single valley from the lands they had 
occupied for generations.10
Population pressure, scarcity of resources, the impact of the global political 
economy, and drought, among other factors aggravate long-standing ethnic 
tensions and can thus accentuate the effects of economic discrimination along 
tribal lines. In times of drought and famine ethnic conflicts are further aggravated 
when affected tribal groups attempt to move into new regions in search of pasture for 
their starving animals." For instance, in the spring of 1989 the killing of 
Senegalese farmers by Mauritanians in the Senegal River basin triggered 
explosions of ethnic violence in the two countries. In Senegal almost all of the 
17,000 shops owned by Moors were destroyed, and their owners were deported 
to Mauritania. In both countries several hundred people were killed, and the two 
nations nearly engaged in war.12 In drought stricken areas, famine relief is used 
by the dominant group as a political weapon resulting in unequal distribution and 
monopoly over the distribution. The dominant groups ensure that their groups 
receive assistance first. In the mid 1980s, the Amhara-dominated regime of Ethopia 
was widely accused of using food aid as a political weapon, preventing the 
distribution of food to areas suspected of collaborting with Eritrean rebels. 
The economic/ethnic squeeze started in the 1960s when for the first time 
Africans dominated their own bureaucracies and controlled their own budgets. 
They controlled employment, designed development programs, and negotiated 
with foreign investors and governments. A decade later, by the 1970s the relative 
peace and optimism of the 1960s began to fade. The purchasing power of individual 
incomes has declined steadily as has per capita food production and consumption.13 
The reasons for this outcome are many and are due to the combined and interactive 
effects of the decline in commodity prices, the debt burden, inappropriate 
agricultural policies, and rising population pressure. Annual food imports 
continue to accelerate and nearly every African country imports food adding to 
the already significant debt burden. As scarcity of goods and services, and 
development costs continue to rise, and as populations increase and food 
production declines, dominant ethnic groups will continue to experience challenges 
to their control, and these groups may well resort to the use of force to maintain 
their economic position. 
Conflict between language, religion, and customs of people from different 
ethnic groups has been — and probably will continue to be — a primary source of 
unrest in the African continent. The antecedents and dynamics of these varied 
conflicts that plague many societies have both internal and external dimensions. 
Between group differences dominated by language or phenotypes (collective 
manifest characteristics), or physical attributes, serve as a common denominator of 
many of the ongoing and historical conflicts. In particular, many of the past and 
present armed conflicts in Africa are consequences of ethnic polarization in African 
countries. Generally, members of an ethnic group have a high degree of proximity 
to each other. That is persons maintain relatively close distance to each other in 
space and time, forming communities geographically distinct from other groups. 
African states are characterized by dual and plural societies some of which 
enhance ethnic rivalries. Ethnically dual societies like Rwanda and Burundi now 
and again erupt into violence because each has a permanent Hutu majority and a 
permanent Tutsi minority. In Zimbabwe the potential for ethnic conflict is high 
because it has a permanent Shona majority and a permanent Ndebele minority.14 
These factors are inherent in such countries making violence and its accompanying 
displacement of persons contingent on such factors as, worsening social stratifica-
tion, the increasing dissatisfaction of the minority group, and actual political threats 
from the minority. The substantial numerical margin between two ethnic commu-
nities in a dual society tends to subject the minority group to a position of permanent 
powerlessness. In the case of Burundi the occasional revolt of the Hutu against their 
situation results in serious violence. 
Ethnic violence is also a consequence of conflicts based on multiple groups, 
such as the Oromo-Somali-Eritrean-Tigrean opposition to the Amhara dominance 
in Ethiopia. The Mbundu-Ovimbundu-Bakongo conflict in Angola also represents 
another case of violence emanating from multiple ethnic groups with disagreements 
over such key issues as the definition of the proper boundaries of the political 
community, or redefining the purposes and policies of a political community.15 Civil 
wars and secessionist movements are the consequence. The social distance (in this 
case ethnic differences) between the dominant group and other groups, or the 
minority make for increased misperception and therefore psychologically easier to 
wreak violence on each other.16 During the Ethiopian Civil War, the Amhara-
dominated regime was often accused of massacring entire village populations, 
preventing the distribution of food to drought stricken areas controlled by Eritrean 
or other ethnic rebels. 
Many African regimes, although controlled by dominant ethnic groups, 
nonetheless fall into the category of "weak regimes" because they have limited 
material resources to extensively co-opt insurgents, reallocate resources, and 
induce change. In most African countries, the rate of government expansion has 
shrunk significantly since the 1970s. At the same time the expectations of Africans 
have risen far beyond expectations in the past. The inability to meet the aspirations 
of the large number of educated and qualified citizens tends to aggravate the existing 
ethnic cleavages. 
Conflicts erupt because ethnic groups or individuals from particular groups 
are irretrievably caught up in the daily process of comparing their power, wealth, 
or status position with those of other groups. Comparisons do not automatically 
produce conflicts. This circumstance occurs when the value system and the 
structure of the reward system are seen and perceived to be unjustly applied by the 
dominant group against the deprived ones. The conflict potential is higher if the 
reward system is very blatant in its manifestation of inequality. Since 1959 Burundi, 
for example, has experienced serious ethnic conflict between the numerically 
dominant Hutu and the socio-economically and politically dominant Tutsi.17 The 
Ethiopian conflict also had undertones of inequality in terms of ethnic relations. The 
Military Administrative Council (The Derg) was composed of elites drawn largely 
from the Amhara ethnic group. The challenge of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 
against the Ethiopian government was largely motivated by opposition to the 
seizure and redistribution of Oromo land among other Ethiopians.18
Manfred Halperin used the concept of emanation to underscore the sacred-
ness of relationships like the tribe, ethnic group, nation, or religion in Africa.19 All 
over the world, Africa included, individuals live out their entire lives submerged as 
emanations of another — it could be a political movement, a leader, a dogma, or 
ethnic group as in the case of Liberia. In other words, the traditional African, based 
on this notion of emanation, view themselves as an extension not only of a kinship 
group but of their entire ethnic community. This is also the relationship that 
motivates the mutual massacres between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi and Rwanda, 
and the violence of Gio and Mano against the Krahn and Mandingo in the Liberian 
conflict. In such ethnic conflicts, so many willingly fight and die for the preservation 
of their tribe, such that the emotionally-based motivation surpasses any national 
cost-benefit analysis. 
The reality of emanation means that everyone is not free of the constraints 
and stimulus of living within inherited relationships. As Ali Mazrui underscored in 
his analysis of tribal conflict in Burundi and Rwanda, no one trapped within a 
"sacred emanational container, however large or small its size, is capable of seeing 
humanity as a single species."20 In other words, within each ethnic or tribal vessel, 
people to a large extent, think and act quite differently. The national integration 
problematique in African countries is that the inherited sacred tribal containers 
within most states are greater in number than in many other regions in the world; and 
the peoples within the containers are still far less integrated with other contained 
peoples in their ethnic group. The reality and awareness of self-containment 
produces negative consequences of interethnic conflict when underlined by the 
zero-sum nature of politics manifested in a winner-take-all behavior of ethnic 
relations. 
Certain forms of violence arise out of a perception of vertical political and 
economic dualism where one tribe monopolizes privilege in a country.21 This 
perception is accentuated by the fact that the various indigenous cultures making up 
all but a handful of African states speak different languages, and are, or may be, 
products of different cultural histories. This sharpens the sense of distinctiveness 
from other groups, even when apeople are politicized and nation-minded. Interethnic 
conflicts and primordial distinctiveness are resuscitated by the stress and tension 
created by the struggle for educational, employment, and other opportunities. There 
are those rare moments when tribal groups see themselves as alien to one another, 
such that ethnic atrocities, or genocide are committed with ease resulting in a certain 
degree of dehumanization caused by a sense of cultural distance. When conflict 
erupts because of ethnic inequalities, manifesting violence between the group that 
monopolizes most economic and political opportunities and those who do not, the 
quarrel may be about who should exercise ultimate authority (those in power and 
others who are aspiring to), or about national directions and goals, or both of these 
issues. In any case, economic and political ideologies of the community are not in 
question. 
The distinction between disagreements over concrete policies and disagree-
ments over who holds power is important, though the two are often intertwined. 
Violent interethnic conflicts are often focused on the central issue of who shall rule 
the country, or who shall determine its direction, and not necessarily or very precisely 
on what those directions should be. The outburst of interethnic bloodletting has to do 
with power and control, and the focus on, and consciousness of, these fuel ethnic 
violence and mutual bloodletting. Indeed, it is not unusual for leaders of rival warring 
factions — which are usually ethnically based — to have been close colleagues in 
precisely the same national army prior to the outbreak of interethnic violence. The 
essay will now examine the specific example of the Liberian Civil War. 
THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR 
Liberia Under Americo-Liberian Hegemony 
In 1822, Liberia became a haven for former American slaves. Unlike other 
settlements administered by European powers as colonial territories, it was never 
a de jure United States colony, and became an independent republic as early as 26 
July 1847. The "Americo-Liberians," descendants of the former American slaves 
formed a distinct cultural and social minority that dominated all aspects of national 
life — political, economic, cultural, and social — for more than a century. By the 
early 1920s they had become the dominant elite of a society that also included 16 
indigenous ethnic groups. As the unchallenged elite of Liberia, they introduced and 
maintained political structures strongly influenced by those in the United States 
with a bicameral legislature and governmental authority divided between the three 
branches of government. The instruments of political control and domination were 
the True Whig Party formed in 1870. the Christian churches, and the Masonic Order. 
institutions to which the key political elites belonged. Liberia experienced a short -
period of two-party democracy in the late nineteenth century after which the True 
Whig Party held a monopoly of power under successive presidents until the 
overthrow of the First Republic in 1980.22 During the presidency of William V.S. 
Tubman — Liberia's first post-World War II president — in January 1944, the 
National Unification Policy was introduced to ameliorate the tensions between 
Americo-Liberians and the indigenous peoples. For example, amendments to the 
constitution were made that gave indigenous ethnic groups and women the right to 
vote, provided they owned real estate or other property. These conditions, no doubt. 
constituted a significant limiting factor to national integration, and the overall 
exercise of democratic rights by the indigenous people. In other words, the elite 
continued to monopolize political power, and challenges to presidential authority 
and control were crushed. 
When President Tubman died in July 1971, he was succeeded by William R. 
Tolbert, who had been his vice-president for 19 years. The Americo-Liberian 
hegemony was soon plagued by economic and political problems. In 1973, Liberia 
joined the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and hosted 
its ministerial meeting in 1975. In March 1978, President Tolbert arranged a second 
meeting of ECOWAS, which successfully negotiated the differences between 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. In 1979, he spent an inordinate amount of money 
hosting the OAU Summit Meeting in Monrovia, the capital. These self-imposed 
economic burdens coupled with the effects of the sharp rise in petroleum prices and 
the declining world demand for Liberia's main exports (iron ore and rubber) 
affected Tolbert's ability to handle the domestic political crisis that ensued.23
Tolbert's political performance was no better than his economic 
performance. Economic difficulties were aggravated by widespread 
mismanagement and graft. His tolerance for criticism was short-lived as he 
became increasingly authoritarian, encouraging little or no political dissent or 
opposition. The long tradition of patron-client relations that had formed ihe basis 
of the political system continued, and the news media became the propaganda 
instrument for the government. General opposition to the regime, long suppressed 
but never extinguished, found expression in two main opposition movements 
formed in the late 1970s: the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), subsequently 
renamed the Progressive People's Party (PPP), and the Movement for Justice in 
Africa (MOJA).24 Tolbert's downfall was precipitated by a campaign to encourage 
local rice production by increasing its price to consumers. Thus, the government 
announced a 50 per cent increase in the price of a bag of rice in 1979. A 
demonstration opposing the increase was organized in Monrovia on 14 July 1979. It 
escalated into riots and looting and proved to be a watershed in Liberia's history. 
In response the government quickly subsidized rice prices, and legalized the PAL 
as an official opposition party under 
the name of the PPP in December 1979.25 In spite of these last minute reforms, the 
government never regained the upper hand. On 12 April 1980, a small group of 
soldiers, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, seized the executive mansion, killed 
Tolbert, and overthrew the government. The consequence was the end of Americo-
Liberian dominance, and the subsequent ethnic turbulence the country has witnessed. 
Samuel Doe's Governance and Ethnic Polarization 
The success of the April 1980 coup d'etat by mostly young non-commis-
sioned officers spearheaded by Samuel Doe ended the long dominance of Liberian 
society by the True Whig Party and its overwhelming Americo-Liberian leadership. 
Ten days after the successful coup the People's Redemption Council (PRC), the 
new governing body with Doe as its chairman, ordered the summary execution of 
thirteen prominent officials of the ancien regime on a public beach in Monrovia. 
Many Liberians overwhelmingly of native background commended heartily the 
actions of the PRC and expressed joy at the overthrow of the Americo-Liberian 
oligarchy and the end of the True Whig Party's repressive rule. Along with the 
rejoicing were rising expectations that significant improvement would take place in 
both the political and socio-economic fortunes of the average Liberian citizen. 
Contrary to popular belief, the 1980 coup d'etat in Liberia not only removed 
an Americo-Liberian oligarchy, but it also weakened the solidarity of the indig-
enous ethnic groups. It, in addition, shattered the established Liberian tradition of 
peaceful transitions of power. Initially, Doe sought national legitimacy and inter-
national recognition by forming a coalition cabinet that included civilian members, 
and representing various sections of society, and even including some former 
members of the Tolbert regime. 
However, the PRC as the "guardian of the revolution," and Doe as the 
supposed liberator, did not live up to their rhetoric. To consolidate his power and 
secure his position, Doe increasingly installed many members of his own small 
ethnic group, the Krahn, in positions of authority while also increasing the security 
forces guarding him.26 He and his lieutenants used their political positions to enrich 
themselves, and Doe's simple military status was exchanged for trappings of power, 
and symbols of prestige that he had ostensibly eschewed in the early days of his rule. 
Moreover, the Doe government inherited a foreign debt of $800 million and a 
budgetary deficit of $71 million. Increased domestic expectations after the toppling 
of the Tolbert regime, coupled with a decline in foreign business confidence and the 
weakness of the international iron ore market, placed further strains on the 
economy. Government spending on public order and defence increased from $21 
million to $52 million between 1979 and 1981. and civil service salaries were also 
raised. Drastic attempts to reduce government spending culminated in a reduction 
of 25 percent in the wages of all government employees, except the armed forces, 
from December 1985.27 Thus, the high expectations of 1980 slowly turned to 
disenchantment as Doe repeatedly dashed hopes for a better political and social 
order. Continued favoritism shown toward the Krahn aggravated ethnic tensions 
and exposed the fissures among the indigenous peoples that had long been dormant 
under Americo-Liberian hegemony. 
After refusing to obey the rules of the Constitutional Commission, Doe 
ended up rigging the general elections of 1985 to ensure his victory. The increasing 
insecurity after his dubious victory in the elections increased the level of political 
repression. Political parties were proscribed and their leaders arrested on trumped 
up charges: freedom of speech and political expression were further severely 
curtailed: more frequent intervention by the army in university campuses became 
the trend. 
By 1985, even though there were few signs of overt violence by the Doe 
regime against any ethnic group, there existed a situation where the Krahn were 
disproportionately represented in government and other avenues of opportunity. 
This translated into denying individuals who belonged to other ethnic groups their 
human rights in economic and other opportunities. The increasing level of political 
repression coupled with the continued favoritism shown toward the Krahn, no doubt 
aggravated ethnic tensions and created a social gulf among the indigenous peoples 
that had long been kept closed by Americo-Liberian hegemony. The 1980 coup had 
merely substituted ethnic domination by one group for ethnic domination by 
another. The grievances and concerns remained the same, and had worsened in 
many respects. 
Ethnic Identity and Bloodletting 
The ethnic undercurrent of the civil war can be traced to the rupture between 
Doe and General Thomas Quiwonkpa, Doe's erstwhile military colleague. There-
after, Nimba County, the home of Quiwonkpa, became the scene of activity directed 
against the Doe regime. The personal animosity between the two was further 
intensified when Quiwonkpa launched a coup attempt against Doe in November 
1985 in which between 500 and 1000 people are thought to have died in Nimba.28 
Thus, the Quiwonkpa coup attempt served to expose the increasing ethnic 
polarization in Liberian society that had become a key element of political 
manipulation under the Doe regime. Although many prominent politicians from 
Nimba County were part of Doe's cabinet, a growing rivalry and ethnic 
separation developed between Doe's Krahn and Mandingo supporters and the 
people of Nimba County.29 Even before the outbreak of the civil war, the other 
Liberian ethnic groups viewed a fight between the Krahns on the one hand and the 
Gios and Manos of Nimba on the other as a fight to the death. 
Quiwoukpa's 1985 abortive coup presented the most serious challenge to 
Doe's Krahn-dominated government. The coup unleashed massacres by 
government troops that were not only extensive but had overtones of ethnic 
genocide. According to Gus Liebenow: 
Krahn soldiers, moreover, in one of the worst manifestations of the 
'new tribalism' — were given almost carte blanche authority to carry 
out a brutal campaign against the Gio and Mano areas of Nimba 
County, where the support for Jackson Doe and Quiwoukpa was the 
strongest. Charges of ethnic genocide toward the Gio were being 
raised against the Krahn within the military.'" 
The complete violent ethnic polarization finally came toward the end of 
December 1989 when Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) invaded Nimba County from neighboring Ivory Coast. President Doe did 
his best to repel the invasion, but the brutal counterattacks of his Krahn-dominated 
army served only to further alienate the inhabitants of Nimba County, and they went 
on to join the rebel forces in large numbers. Civil war took center stage underlined 
by ethnic polarization: the NPFL drew the bulk of its fighters and supporters from 
the Gio and Mano, while government soldiers, predominantly Krahn, were aided by 
the Mandingos. 
Charles Taylor capitalized on the already existing ethnic polarization by 
invading Liberia through Nimba County and recruiting his fighting forces locally. 
He knew that this county would be most sympathetic to an anti-Doe rebellion.31 
Members of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups have long complained that they have 
been oppressed by members of Doe's ethnic group, the Krahn. Besides, Doe and his 
close supporters compounded the ethnic issues at stake when, as soon as Taylor 
announced the commencement of his invasion, they targeted villages in Nimba 
County for direct attack and punitive expeditions.32 This increased the support in 
Nimba for Taylor's invasion and led to the core of his NPFL force being spear-
headed largely by young people from Nimba County. Furthermore, in Monrovia, 
Doe fuelled the ethnic conflict when he gave carte blanche citizenship to all 
Mandingos in the county, some of whom were still citizens of neighboring Guinea. 
The Gios and Manos have refused to recognize them as Liberians. Besides, there is 
an age-old rift in Nimba County over the Mandingos. They, from a Muslim religious 
point of view, look down on the Gios and Manos as infidels because of either their 
adherence to African religions or to Christianity. 
As a result of the crushing defeat suffered in Nimba County by July 1990, 
Doe's Krahn soldiers retaliated by murdering as many Monrovia-based Gio and 
Mano as possible. In turn the Gio and Mano retaliated when civilian Krahn and 
Mandingo peoples were summarily executed near Paynesville, east of Monrovia. 
One of the most reported instances of ethnic bloodletting occurred when at about the 
same time (July 1990), 30 Krahn and Mandingo soldiers burst into a church 
compound in Monrovia and without warning killed 600 people (mainly Mano and 
Gio) as they slept.33 In other words, as the rebel forces took over large parts of the 
country and surrounded the capital, the fighting took on an increasingly ethnic 
character. By July 1990, the government army's ranks had been systematically 
purged of most soldiers who did not belong to President Doe's ethnic group, the 
Krahns. At least three-quarters of the government's troops, then estimated at about 
7,200 were said to be Krahns.34
The massacres in Monrovia by the Doe regime, intensified when the NPFL 
started closing in on Monrovia. Government soldiers further expanded their targets 
to include the Americo-Liberians and rampaged their settlements. The calculated 
slaughtering of Gios and Manos and Americo-Liberians by the Doe regime was to 
serve as a deterrent to the fast advancing rebel forces. Therefore, some of the killings 
were a grim portent that Liberia's vicious ethnic bloodletting was now engulfing a 
segment of society previously untouched: the Americo-Liberians or descendants of 
the freed slaves. 
It could be argued that with the coup d'etat of 1980 and the end of Americo-
Liberian hegemony. Liberia's structural imbalances became more pronounced 
under a repressive Doe regime, and was manifested in a high level of politicization. 
but a low level of national integration, in the context of a weak national economy. 
Moreover, the persistence of the unethical distribution of power and influence 
through ethnic favoritism led to challenges, forcing the Doe regime to maintain 
itself solely through the use of force. The "accelerator" to the ethnic-based civil war 
came when the Doe regime attacked Nimba County and massacred in the process 
many Gio and Mano. 
CONCLUSION 
Liberia's civil war was a contemporary manifestation of a historical legacy 
— the Americo-Liberian hegemony over the indigenous peoples — the end of 
which produced unwanted consequences related to problems of unsuccessful 
national integration. Under Samuel Doe. Liberia had become a country where the 
political dominance by one group, the Krahn, resulted in the legitimacy of 
government being challenged. The ensuing ethnopolitical violence between 
Krahn/ Mandingo on the one hand, and Gio/Mano on the other, became very 
calculated and deliberate, and not random. The victims on either side were 
carefully targeted by ethnic affiliation. 
Before Doe overthrew the Americo-Liberian political hegemony, the major 
ethnic tensions revolved around relations between the Americo-Liberian elite and 
the rest of the indigenous population. But the ascension to power of an indigenous 
leader, and the ensuing general socio-economic deterioration, opened the political 
contest among competing indigenous ethnic groups. Thus, while the 1980 coup 
d'etat in Liberia overthrew the lengthy Americo-Liberian hegemony, it nonetheless 
eventually introduced a level of ethnic animosity not previously known, and it also 
destabilized the indigenous ethnic unity that had existed during the Americo-
Liberian politico-economic dominance. 
In sum, four factors seem to underlie the ethnopolitical violence of Liberia's 
civil war. First, the ethnic bloodletting — torture and killings — though modern in 
context, was largely a display of historical forces at work: the long absence of a 
democratic political culture among the various ethnic groups. Second was the 
difficulties of consolidating legitimate power in an environment of economic 
decline and general socio-economic deterioration. Third was the ease with which 
inadequate policies of national integration can degenerate into ethnopolitical 
violence. Finally, the difficulties of the ongoing peacemaking negotiations offer an 
excellent example of the problems associated with protracted conflicts in an environ-
ment of ethnic insecurity coupled with general socio-economic deterioration. 
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